

---

# AFRICAN STATES AT THE COURT OF (INTERNATIONAL) NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

## LES ÉTATS AFRICAINS AU TRIBUNAL DES ORGANISATIONS (INTERNATIONALES) NON GOUVERNEMENTALES

Auteur 1 : YEBEGA NDJANA Nicolas Junior.

---

**YEBEGA NDJANA Nicolas Junior**, Department of political science,  
University of Douala-Cameroon.,

**Déclaration de divulgation** : L'auteur n'a pas connaissance de quelconque financement qui pourrait affecter l'objectivité de cette étude.

**Conflit d'intérêts** : L'auteur ne signale aucun conflit d'intérêts.

**Pour citer cet article** : YEBEGA NDJANA Nicolas Junior (2026) « AFRICAN STATES AT THE COURT OF (INTERNATIONAL) NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS », African Scientific Journal « Volume 03, Num 36 » pp: 2329 – 2353.



DOI : 10.5281/zenodo.21026213

Copyright © 2026 – ASJ



**Abstract**

On February 27, 2020, the Cameroonian Government made yet another governmental communication to justify itself and "re-establish the truth" following yet another accusatory report by an international NGO HRW in the Ilaria Allegrozzi case. This scenario has become commonplace in African politics and the fable of the 'fly and the lion' has never made so much sense in international relations. This article aims to analyse the relationship and interaction between NGOs and states in Africa. Are NGOs in their power activities, counter-powers or anti-powers; champions of transparency or hidden powers of interference? The hypothesis is that the State, as guarantor of national or international order, has moved from the comfortable position of monopoly to the uncomfortable one of constantly having to justify itself. The INGOs are at the heart of this international hunt for "rogue states"; rightly or wrongly, for justice or by instrumentalization. Their acts or reports of accusation are from now on the barometers of international credibility of the African States, failing to found legal actions. It is as if these organisations have become the new courts of state policy. Against a transnationalist theoretical background and with the help of the observation of African international political life, this article aims to take account of the INGO vs. State confrontation and shows how the actors of humanitarian policies become political humanitarians.

**Keywords:** INGOs; African States; international civil society; judicialisation of political life; international politics.

## Résumé

Le 27 février 2020, le Gouvernement camerounais faisait encore une énième communication gouvernementale pour se justifier et « rétablir la vérité » suite à un énième rapport accusateur d'une ONG internationale HRW dans l'affaire Ilaria Allegrozzi. Ce scénario est devenu banal dans la vie politique africaine et la fable de « la mouche et le lion » n'aura jamais autant fait sens en relations internationales. Cet article vise à analyser les rapports et interactions entre les ONG et les États en Afrique. Les ONG dans leurs activités sont-elles des pouvoirs, des contre-pouvoirs ou des anti-pouvoirs ; des chantres de la transparence ou des puissances occultes de l'ingérence ? L'hypothèse est que de garant de l'ordre national ou international, l'État ce dernier est passé de la situation confortable de monopole, pour celle inconfortable de sans cesse se justifier. Les OING sont au cœur de cette chasse internationale aux « États-voyous » ; à tort ou à raison, pour la justice ou par instrumentalisation. Leurs actes ou rapports d'accusation sont désormais les baromètres de crédibilité internationale des États africains, à défaut de fonder des actions en justice. Tout se passe comme si ces organisations sont devenues les nouveaux tribunaux des politiques des États. Sur un fond théorique transnationaliste et à l'aide de l'observation de la vie politique internationale africaine, cet article vise à rendre compte du face à face OING vs. États et montre comment les acteurs des politiques humanitaires deviennent des humanitaires politiques.

**Mots clés :** OING ; États africains ; Société civile internationale ; judiciarisation de la vie politique ; politique internationale.

## Introduction

Africa can be described as a "continent of interference." Interference refers to the interventions of foreign countries in African's affair. It is an historical phenomenon, that is now called neocolonialism. Its manifestations are rivalries between the West, Russia, and China; often through NGOs. This leads to the perception that the continent is constantly being judged by those who presume to know better. On 25 February 2020, the NGO *Human Rights Watch* published yet another report by its researcher Ilaria Allegrozzi, which, as is often the case, provoked a strong reaction of disapproval from the Cameroonian government, which described the accusations as "*unfounded and outrageous*". This recent news reminds us that in the international scene, new actors are now interfering in the relations between States and international organizations. They obey their own logic of complementarity, competition, denunciation or defiance. This change is leading to the emergence of a diversified transnational world, made up of non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and individuals who were previously excluded from the international game (Gazano, 2011: 77). The state with its soldiers and diplomats (Aron, 1960) ceases to be the sole regent of the international scene. Unlike states and IGOs who are actors and subjects of international law, the new protagonists are only actors and are meant to be more diffuse. The NGOs that are the subject of this study are an illustration of this. This subject is interesting because historically there has not been much discussion of the role of civil society and citizens in international politics. In spite of a generic name that is often questioned, the expression NGO has the merit of being consecrated since Article 71 of the UN Charter expressly refers to it. In spite of definitional differences according to the elaborations of each author, a consensus is emerging around its main characteristics.

The NGO is an association of private individuals or legal entities, of different nationalities, international in its structure, functions and action, without any profit motive. It is subject to the national law of the State where it has established its headquarters (Gazano, 2011: 78). According to the Union of International Associations, an NGO is "*any association composed of representatives belonging to one or more countries and which is international in its functions, the composition of its leadership and the sources of its funding. It is not for profit and has consultative status with an intergovernmental organization*" (Laroche Josepha, 2000: 134-135). The phenomenon grew during the 20th century and reached unprecedented proportions. According to the Union of International Associations, there are approximately 38,000 NGOs spread across all continents, even if the European location remains dominant (Gazano, 2011: 78). These NGOs operate in a wide variety of fields (more than a hundred) that

Josepha Laroche has wisely grouped into four main categories: *Corporate organizations*, focused on defending the interests of their members within specialized Institutions such as the FAO, WHO or the International Labour Office (ILO), *technical organizations* such as the International Commission on Radiological Protection, *social and humanitarian organizations* such as Amnesty International, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Doctors without Borders (Nobel Peace Prize 1999), Doctors of the World or Greenpeace and finally *scholarly organizations* such as the Institute of International Law, the Carnegie Foundation or the Pugwash Movement (Laroche Josepha, 2000: 134-135; Gazano, 2011: 78).

Because they mobilize for causes, their purpose is not lucrative, which distinguishes them from multinational firms. They are therefore social groups pursuing forms of collective action (Battistella, Petiteville, Smouts and Vennesson, 2012: 414), hence the idea of international civil society. The paradigm of so-called 'civil society' as a counter-power to the state, which emerged from Alexis de Tocqueville's work on American democracy in the nineteenth century (Audier, 2006), remains very appealing today on both the national and international levels. At the international level, if the thesis of the existence of an international civil society is not yet fully developed, the fact remains that the international action of non-governmental organizations is very visible. This visibility has gone beyond the limits of simple reports and pleas to become real acts of accusation challenging the central actor in international relations, the State. This prompted Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos in 2015 to question whether NGOs are a new global power (2015: 7). NGOs then present themselves as a kind of vigilante, guarantors of international morality and do not hesitate to denounce, to bring to justice, to demand justice against the Leviathans (Hobbes). From being guarantors of the national or international order, the States have gone from the comfortable situation of monopoly to the uncomfortable one of constantly justifying themselves or being judged. The INGOs are at the heart of this international cabal of "rogue states"; rightly or wrongly, for the sake of justice or by instrumentalization. Their acts or reports of accusation are from now on the barometers of international credibility of the African States, failing to found actions in justice. It is as if these organisations have become the new courts of state policy.

How does this practice take shape and how does it influence the foreign policy of the indexed states? What is the posture of the States or governments concerned in the face of these "new forms of opposition" or "courts"? The hypothesis that structures this discussion is that of an accusatory hyperactivity of the INGOs in the African political scene that constantly puts the governors in a posture of media, political or even jurisdictional defence; to the point where they

are perceived as the barometers of good governance. Drawing on the transnationalist approach to international relations (Keohane and Nye, Rosenau, Badie, Smouts, Devin, Cohen, Chouala...) and in the theories of democratic governance and governance in international relations (Smouts, 1998; Létourneau, Paquet, Hermet, Kazancigil and Prud'homme, 2005), this article aims to highlight both the disarticulation of the state as a central actor in international relations by a new actor (the NGO), and a part of the transnationalisation and international judicialisation of political life in Africa. The research methodology was based on direct or indirect observation; media coverage; exploration of archives and various documents; and the views of certain figures in the Cameroonian and African public spheres. To simplify, the debate surrounding the role of NGOs in Africa oscillates between recognizing their essential humanitarian aid and the accusation of political interference. While these organizations often fill the gaps left by states in vital sectors, they are increasingly perceived by many governments and activists as instruments of Western influence (Nloga, 2023; Mengue, 2023).

### **1. The advent of INGOs/NGOs as structuring and parasitic actors on the international scene**

The realist theory of international relations has long affirmed the centrality of the State and national governments as actors on the international scene (Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1948; Aron, 1962). However, the reconfiguration and the increasing complexity of this scene have led to the emergence of a tangle of other actors who challenge the State, question its actions and evaluate them. This is the case of the NGOs which, since their advent, have posed as guarantors of international morality to the point of weakening the power and deployment of States. How can we understand this reversal of the roles of actors in international relations in general and in the African case in particular?

#### **1.1. Understanding the plot: the original place of INGOs/NGOs among the actors of international relations**

How did the INGOs emerge and what was their original role in the international game? The acronym NGO appears for the first time in the United Nations Charter of 1945. The context of their emergence, their very circumscribed legal nature and their charitable or reliefist ambitions did not make them suitable for political intrusion.

It is necessary to look into the philosophy of "humanism" and the "humanitarian" movement to restore the debate. Both words have the same etymology, qualifying actions, organisations and a system that act in favour of the most disadvantaged, in the name of human solidarity (Maietta, 2015: 53). The origin of solidarity actions is traced to Christian charitable orders in the 15th

century, at a time when Christianity was the state religion. The Church became a charitable enterprise. This was the era of the Church as doctor, because hospitals were founded by the Church, closely linked to religion and managed by members of the clergy. At the same time and with the urban expansion, hospices were created by rich laymen who, in addition to helping, donated their goods. The best known is undoubtedly the institution of the Hospices de Beaune, founded by Chancellor Rollin, whose annual proceeds from auctions of its wine production are still donated to charity today (Bioforce, 2012). Very quickly, these philanthropic dynamics began to make their first grounds with the creation of the first NGOs. In 1812, we begin to talk about emergency humanitarian actions. That was the year when the United States sent relief supplies to Venezuela, which had been almost destroyed by a violent earthquake, and to Ireland, where there was a great famine. Some of these territories affected by natural calamities gave way to military struggles with war crimes, as was the case with the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830). Philhellenism, a solidarity movement, was born and sent funds and clothing to the Greek insurgents fighting against the Ottoman occupiers.

It was really between 1854 and 1855 that the first NGO was created. Florence Nightingale, a wealthy British woman and a renowned nurse, set up medical teams that intervened in the Crimean War (1853-1856), in the United States during the American Civil War (1861-1865) and in France during the 1870 war. A few years later, Henri Dunant, a Swiss humanist and businessman distressed by the horrors perpetrated during the battle of Solferino on June 24, 1859, created a private charitable organization symbolized by a red cross, which would later take on the name we know today: The International Red Cross.

The Second World War will accelerate the creation of new charitable institutions such as Oxfam in 1942 and Care USA in 1945. It is with the Biafran war (1967-1970) - when an open letter denouncing the “genocide”, the “death camps” and accusing the French and international delegations of not having acted, alerts public opinion - that the concept of neutrality of NGOs is questioned for the first time. Some members of the Red Cross decided to create an emergency medical organization that was freer to speak and act, the *Groupe d’Intervention médico-chirurgicale d’urgence* (GIMCU). This was the beginning of the “*French Doctors*”. During the serious crisis that shook Bangladesh (1970), an appeal to French doctors was launched, giving birth to Secours Médical Français, which was joined by the members of GIMCU. It was the coming together of these two groups of young practitioners that gave birth to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). The 1980s saw the advent of a new wave of NGOs with Action contre la Faim and Aide Médicale Internationale in 1979 and Handicap International in 1982. To borrow

from Bioforce, the social imaginary of the doctor intervening in the field of major disasters was gradually enriched by more modest figures. From now on, doctors and nurses are joined by volunteers with no expertise in the field but with an unwavering commitment. These young, highly committed volunteers are given the title of “logistician” or, more simply, “handyman” (Bioforce, 2012).

It follows from this brief history that the NGO was not born to make politics and take a stand in the affairs of States. However, it was during the Biafran war (1967-1970) that we saw the first reversal of this trend with the open letter denouncing the "genocide" and the "death camps" and accusing the French and international delegations of not having acted. The humanitarian principle of neutrality of NGOs is broken and questioned by the freedom of speech of dissident humanitarians. The INGOs are now meddling in politics. They are even classified among the new actors in international relations and illustrate the turbulence of the international system which is at the heart of James Rosenau's reflections.

### **1.2. The reversal of the order of actors in international relations: when marginality (INGOs) challenges power (States)**

When they first emerged, NGOs were not thought of as a new international actor. However, their interactions with state actors, their number and, above all, the reshaping of their activities and the new opportunities for governance, now make them powerful pressure groups that give them the status of actor-actor (Loupsans, 2010). They have gone from being simple relief agents to having an immense capacity to influence state policy makers.

This is an illustration of the shocking internationalist theory “*Turbulences in world politics*” by Mr. James Rosenau. As Michel Girard states, the overall construction that Turbulence in world politics presents to us is based on a striking and, to be honest, somewhat trivial starting point: over the last few decades, the world has radically changed and international politics is no longer what it was for centuries (Girard, 1992). Indeed, James Rosenau posits that the inter-state system established since the Treaty of Westphalia had been able to guarantee a certain continuity in world affairs because deep-seated constraints, both organizing and regulating, which he calls "parameters", contained, through their relative stability, all possible changes, even the most important ones, within recognized and predictable limits (Rosenau, 1990). However, for various reasons, these fundamental parameters that regulated the old order were strongly shaken from the 1950s onwards, so that a new, unforeseen and chaotic world was emerging before our eyes, characterized in particular by the development of interdependence and specialization, by the proliferation of non-sovereignty-free actors, by the alteration of

identities under the contradictory effects of centralization and fragmentation, and, even more, by the reorientation of the ties of authority and loyalty that bind individuals (Rosenau, 1990). In its present state, post-international politics would be permanently condemned to turbulence because its basic structures would show a real split (bifurcation) between competing logics: a state world and a multicentric world, which would influence each other without ever being able to truly reconcile themselves (Rosenau, 1990).

NGOs are among the new actors in international relations that can be classified in this dynamic of bifurcation. They embody international civil society through their extraordinary expansion across the planet. What is striking is the extent and speed of this phenomenon during the 1980s and 1990s. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), there were 1,600 NGOs from Western countries in 1980. Ten years later, there are more than 4,500. In their actions, they are at the origin of the construction of international public opinion on several issues. They are the actors of international mobilization for certain causes or against others. They build good or not so good reputations for certain actors of state policies on the national or international level. They challenge the power of States. For internationalists, the expression "international public opinion" refers to the arenas of debate in which an increasing number of protesting actors meet. The growing participation of "civil partners" (of which NGOs are a part) in diplomatic activities, particularly during major United Nations conferences, would thus attest to the existence of a global public "opinion" (Smouts, 1997: 677-693). This phenomenon is of interest to internationalists in that it affects and considerably disrupts the rules and habits of the international game. We can thus say with Bertrand Badie that NGOs and the emergence of international public opinion are at the centre of profound upheavals on the international scene; they are a high point in the agony of power (Badie, 2004: 246), and Africa is one of their favourite places.

### **1.3. Africa, the preferred breeding ground for the power of INGOs/NGOs**

In order to understand the deployment of NGOs in Africa, it is important to quickly revisit the issue of the State in this continent. The State is an eminently Western production. It is the product of history and many authors (Bendix; Eisentadt; Badie; Birnbaum...) have shown how it has evolved. From a Western dynamic (Elias), the State has been exported (Badie). In Africa, it is the fruit of colonization/decolonization. The State elsewhere (Sindjoun, 2002) than in the West and particularly in Africa, both in its internal functioning and in its international projection, has its avatars. It is an epithet state, each time qualified because of its weak institutionalization: borders always contested, political regimes in place always contested,

omnipresence of coups d'état, fragility of democracy, contestation of institutions, weak citizenship. The state in Africa is therefore generally referred to as 'soft', 'weak', 'shaky', 'bankrupt', 'rogue', 'quasi-state', 'patrimonialist', 'rhizome'... (Sindjoun, 2002). The main obstacle to the future development of sub-Saharan Africa is often considered to be political in nature. From this perspective, strong states and representative institutions are seen as necessary preconditions for development, according to a widespread representation among researchers and the media. However, perpetual governments (Owona Nguini, 2019) and their engineering (Yebega, 2016), tribalism, civil wars, as well as a clear disjunction between the formal character of democratic institutions, to the extent that they exist, and the conduct of politics lead to an explosion of conflicts, wars (with their attendant death tolls and misery) and human rights violations that attract the attention and interference of the "international community" and provide a breeding ground for NGOs that promote development aid, political ethics and good governance.

In terms of figures, we are satisfied with these data from Pérouse de Montclos, which show an impressive explosion in the number of NGOs in Africa. For the author:

“Officially, in Burkina Faso there were 274 local and international NGOs in 2000, compared to 87 in 1985. Ethiopia had 419 in 2003, compared to 47 in 1989, and Senegal had 220 in 1991, compared to 126 in 1988. In Ghana, the authorities counted up to 1,300 NGOs in 2001, compared with 350 in 1991, 80 in 1980 and 10 in 1960. Kenya is not to be outdone, with 511 NGOs in 1996, compared with 120 in 1978 and 20 in 1950. In Mozambique, more than 180 NGOs were active in 1990, compared with seven in 1970. The figures are even more staggering if we include the original associations at a very local level, and not only the international solidarity NGOs. There were more than 5,200 NGOs in Uganda in 2006, up to 8,000 in Tanzania in 1997. All these figures are of course only a low range: in countries where formalities are not very developed, many associations are simply not registered with the authorities. However, the economic impact of the sector is far from negligible. NGOs provide about 20% of the total assistance received by Burkina Faso in 1985 or Ethiopia in 1999; up to 25% in Uganda in 1990. In Kenya, their contribution represented a quarter of the government budget in 1990; in Ghana, 1% of the workforce in 1996. In South Africa, where more detailed statistics are available, the 98,920 NGOs registered in 1998 provided just over 1 per cent of GDP and 9 per cent of the non- agricultural workforce in the formal sector of the economy” (Pérouse de Montclos, 2008: 69).

The problem is particularly acute in poor countries where the aid channelled through Western NGOs is a major drain on the national economy, not to mention the state budget.

This growing intervention of NGOs in the development process and in the evolution of societies in the South, especially in African countries, is a fact that is now widely recognized. Jean- Paul Deler points out that although NGOs have long acted discreetly, whether in humanitarian emergencies or in response to specific situations of distress, they are now becoming increasingly involved in the field of social and economic interventions and, as such, are asserting their own identity and their own conceptions in the world of development actors and donors. This rise in the power of NGOs, their growing institutional importance, their organizational diversification, and the range of their activities, which are constantly expanding and changing, raise a number of questions in terms of political and geographical, economic and sociological, intellectual and operational issues (Deler, 1998: 7). The political, economic and managerial sovereignty of states is being shaken. Beyond their humanitarian actions, NGOs in Africa are increasingly criticized for their interference in the political life of States and treated as Trojan horses in socio-political unrest and the fall of so- called non-democratic or authoritarian regimes. They have even been accused of post-colonialism. But how far is this suspicion true?

## **2. INGOs/NGOs versus the State in Africa: from humanitarian to political**

Pérouse de Montclos points out that there are two important aspects to understanding NGOs. The first relates to a contemporary phenomenon, namely the institutionalization of international solidarity associations and, consequently, the ambiguity of their relations with States. The second refers more specifically to a historical reference point of the humanitarian movement, namely the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) (Pérouse de Montclos, 2015: 15). But one observation can be made: the flowering of NGOs in Africa, although concerned with humanitarianism, gives the impression that politics is their new vocation, with aid being only a pretext and interference their mode of action.

### **2.1.NGOs and the ambiguity of relations with the State in Africa: From humanitarian policies to political humanitarianism**

Barbara Delhez in a political analysis note in 2016 entitled "International NGOs in the reconquest of a postcolonial Africa", poses the problem of the State/NGO household in Africa without getting bogged down in diplomacy. His questioning, even if it is awkward for the promoters of humanitarian structures, is not without relevance:

“Do not certain Western NGOs perpetuate relationships of domination in their practices and do they not participate in this Western hegemony in the name of humanist values defined as universal? Isn't the humanitarian world in a way an adjuvant of the politics of Western States and therefore of Western domination? Are NGOs an extension or a new instrument of neo-colonialism? To what extent does the construction of a "homo humanitarus" qualified as "expatriate" participate or not in the perpetuation of power relationships between local and Western personnel? How can we move away from this colonial legacy that continues to shape actions and representations, hinders development and perpetuates relationships that in reference to 'soft power' could be described as “soft colonial” (Delhez, 2016: 2).

This questioning follows the observation of the now intense political activity of these organizations, which are supposed to deal only with humanitarian issues. The NGOs set themselves up as moral guides, make conditionalities and accusations. These accusations against States are numerous: bad governance; the need for change; corruption; violation of human rights and freedoms; ill-gotten gains and illicit enrichment, war crimes, genocide, etc. The accusations take many forms: reports; pleas; forums of international organizations and major States (UN, European Union, African Union, governments of great powers...); international and foreign jurisdictions. They are even linked to new forms of communication: Tweeter, Facebook, You tube, etc.

The example of Human Rights Watch with its researcher in Central and West Africa, Ilaria Allegrozi, is very illustrative in the treatment of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. In this war, which is getting bogged down in the South-West and North-West regions, where separatist groups continue to oppose the Cameroonian defence and security forces, with an upsurge in violence: massacres in schools, villages burnt down, kidnappings, rapes, etc., even though the existence of the United Nations is not yet a reality. At a time when the existence of the State is being called into question by the separatists and despite the "great national dialogue", the NGO, through its researcher, finds that Cameroon "has only made a superficial commitment to finding a solution". To put an end to this crisis which concerns the form of the State, the researcher-activist of the NGO Human Rights Watch, proposes and urges the international community to no more than 'take its responsibilities' and above all advocates 'targeted sanctions' against the separatists and above all the Cameroonian military guilty of exactions. In the midst of the belligerence, his statements do not hide a plea against the Cameroonian state, while access to the conflict zones is difficult:

“There are roadblocks by the separatists and checkpoints by the military that complicate access. Above all, the government fears any outside observation and evaluation of what is happening in the English-speaking area. Humanitarian and human rights NGOs could witness the violence perpetrated by the separatists, but also by the security forces, and the fact that the situation is not under control. It is not in the government's interest to let all this be seen.”

International NGOs and the media denounce, with discriminating tones, the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators - separatists or members of the security forces - of the exactions. In 2020, the trial of three soldiers accused of killing some twenty civilians in Ngarbuh opened in Yaoundé. As the trial proceeds, Human Rights Watch is already setting conditions:

“This trial is extremely important and emblematic because the government initially denied the army's responsibility, preferring to launch a campaign of defamation and denigration of the media and NGOs that had denounced the massacre. Now that he has made a U-turn, he must consider the media, human rights organisations and civil society not as enemies but as allies. To ensure that this progress is real, we must make sure that this trial is fair, that it is open to the public, that all the participants (lawyers, victims, families) are convinced that their safety will be guaranteed. Then, those responsible for these murders, including those who ordered the massacre, must be convicted, because the conclusions of the governmental investigation do not sufficiently establish responsibility. They only incriminate lower-ranking soldiers and fail to mention that they acted under orders from their superiors. Ngarbuh is not an isolated case. There are many other victims of abuse, both by the military and by separatists. This trial represents substantial progress, but it is not enough. It is just a first step in the fight against impunity.”

How can we afford a media trial when the real trial is underway? How can we presume to be complacent about a verdict that is not yet known? This is not humanitarianism, but political activism and interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, which is defending itself against a terrorist group and a separatist movement in line with the prevalence of the “principle of respect for borders inherited from colonization”.

Drawing on the considerations of post-colonial studies (M'bokolo, 2002), the hypothesis of an *“unfinished decolonisation of practices, like that of knowledge and representation”* (Delhez, 2016: 2), can be updated. Following on from Delhez, the observation can be made that NGOs deployed on the African continent are destined to establish their presence over time. Thus, humanitarians, who once intervened with the aim of responding to crisis and emergency situations, have revised their mode of operation, with the consequence that the prospect of a career in this sector is becoming a coveted career path (Delhez, 2016: 2); this contributes to the

dramatization and prolongation of crisis situations if not creating them. Delhez sees a number of problems in this development. First, that of the role and limits to be attributed to NGOs that interfere durably in the socio-political landscapes of African countries, bringing their respective agendas. Secondly, it asks whether the "new humanitarian order", governed by Western NGOs in African countries, does not upset and undermine the national sovereignty of the countries? Finally, it questions the responses of local governments to the vicious circle of assistance and the imagery of the "*white saviour*", the international humanitarian professional driven by careerist impulses? (Delhez, 2016: 2).

This international civil society, which coached the emergence of an African civil society in the 1990s, following the democratization movement, is involved in politics without hiding, especially since it maintains collusion with the political opposition. Their humanitarian mission is transformed into political activism to the point of advocating for changeovers in certain African states, even though their leaders sometimes enjoy electoral legitimacy. It is not uncommon to see them alongside opponents, crowds in the street, supporting insurrections or defending postures of state deconstruction that would not hold in the West (the case of Corsica in France or Catalonia in Spain). This leads us to question their interest in acting, their capacity to act and the objective of their activism.

As an illustration, the HRW researcher, Mrs. Allegrozi, did not refrain from proposing sentences against Cameroon in the context of the Anglophone secessionist crisis in Cameroon: "It is really time for the international community to take its responsibility to face the crisis, recognize its magnitude and commit to resolving it. The African Union has so far been largely silent. We need targeted sanctions: asset freezes, travel bans on both the leaders of the separatist groups and members of the defense and security forces and the Cameroonian authorities who are responsible for crimes."

This is a real change in the humanitarian profession. Of course, if it is a human rights NGO, is defending human rights exempt from the requirements of neutrality and sovereignty?

Cameroon is not an isolated example. The so-called ill-gotten gains trial in Paris, in which the vice-president of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, is on trial, followed a complaint by the NGOs Transparency International France and Sherpa in 2008, which accused him of having enriched himself with money from the public treasury. Also in 2008, the two organisations filed a civil suit against two other heads of state, Denis Sassou Nguesso (Congo-Brazzaville) and Omar Bongo (Gabon) and members of their entourage, alleging that they had acquired substantial real estate and personal property in France. French judges completed the

investigation of the Gabonese part of the case in August 2017 and the investigation into the French assets of the Bongo Sassou-Nguesso family is still ongoing. In the opinion of some analysts and especially the leaders of these countries (Equatorial Guinea in this case), it is a "media tribunal" and "a desire to harm (its) leaders". They denounce interference and a desire to destabilize states that are supposed to be sovereign.

It follows from these examples and following a postcolonial analysis perspective, that it is not totally wrong to suspect that Western NGOs active, covering the African soil, present faces and practice uses that it seems interesting to question with regard to the Eurocentrism and Westernization of the world. Indeed, as Delhez (2016) points out, some Western NGOs seem to perpetuate in their practices, relationships of domination. They participate in the construction and perpetuation of this Western hegemony in the name of humanist values defined as universal. It is therefore difficult for the humanitarian world to escape the suspicion that it is an adjunct to the policies of Western states and therefore to Western domination. NGOs are seen as an extension or new instrument of neo-colonialism. But how do States react or how do they reinvent their policies in the face of these changes in the contestation of sovereignty?

### **2.2. The defence of African States in the face of INGOs/NGOs: Between pusillanimity and sovereignist jolts**

The State/NGO relationship is now a war without a name. States must now confront NGOs or at least fight or justify themselves in the face of their attacks. Born of very noble humanist intentions, the first international NGOs acted in a neutral, independent and universal way to care for the victims of wars and conflicts. It was the good old days of the militant Association of "French Doctors", which today has become a multinational professional humanitarian organisation: Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Since the 1980s and 90s, the role of NGOs has changed considerably, becoming so large in society that they are approaching the functioning of companies with different fundraising departments. Moreover, communication is no longer content with the neutrality once prescribed in their charters. For example, in its 1971 charter, MSF stipulated that doctors "shall refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the States in which they are called to serve" and "shall refrain from publicly expressing an opinion" (Hourquebie, 2001). These mentions were removed 20 years later and the new role of advocacy, raising public awareness through high-profile actions and "responsibility in the management of the planet and the people who live on it" has legitimately become that of NGOs in the collective consciousness (Delhez, 2016: 3).

Faced with these accusations and these courts of a new kind, African states react with varying degrees of success, weakened as they are by the defects of governance, democracy, development and human rights violations. The defence of their sovereignty in the face of these NGOs is therefore rather flaccid; oscillating between pusillanimity and bursts of pride. But these states react. Their defence consists of official denials and counter-reports; the commissioning of counter-experts and media emissaries; the suspension of activities on the territory and the management of jurisdictional procedures.

- **Official denials and government counter-reports**

The defense of choice for governments in the face of NGO accusations is denial. In December 2015, Amnesty International, through the voice of Alioune Tine its director general for West and Central Africa, accused the Cameroonian government, claiming to have "identified" 131 people who have not given any sign of life since their arrest in northern Cameroon by soldiers of the Cameroonian army, as part of the fight against Boko-Haram; and "25 people died in detention" . The response of the Cameroonian government through the voice of its Minister of Communication Issa Tchiroma Bakari was a denial. On BBC Africa, he reported arrests based on "the anti-terrorism law" of 2014 and the "Code of Criminal Procedure" of Cameroon. For the Cameroonian government spokesman, it is "the ignorance of these two legal instruments, which preside over the march of (the) justice (Cameroonian), which probably leads the leaders of Amnesty International to say everything and its opposite."

The facts were similar when Human Rights Watch published a report on February 25, 2020 entitled, "Cameroon: Massacre of Civilians in the Separatist Region." In reaction, in a government communication entitled "Response of the Cameroonian government to the unfounded and outrageous claims contained in the report of the NGO Human Rights Watch: a manifestly biased and essentially incriminating report, against the National Defence and Security Forces", the Cameroonian authorities once again through the Minister of Communication rejected the contents of this document. René Sadi denounced its partiality and the links between its author and terrorist circles. The State of Cameroon rejected the allegations of HRW and recalled that an investigation had been instructed by the Head of State to shed light on this tragedy. The Cameroonian Minister of Communication then protested against the sententious attitude of the NGOs:

“While the investigation is underway, the NGO "Human Rights Watch", like several other groups claiming the status of political activists or human rights defenders, hastened to publish an erroneous assessment of this regrettable incident, while describing in great detail and in a

fanciful way, the supposed events of the sequence of events, as well as the presumed perpetrators, without having carried out the slightest raid on the ground, or any investigation”.

- **Accusations of interference and complicity with enemies of the state**

Another way in which states defend themselves against NGO denunciations is by making accusations of interference, espionage and complicity. In the case of the separatist crisis in Cameroon, the government accuses the NGO Human Rights Watch of having sided with "the secessionist terrorists". René Emmanuel SADI reveals in this regard that:

“The Cameroonian Government has indeed been in possession of irrefutable evidence establishing links between, on the one hand, Mrs. Ilaria Allegrozzi, presented as a senior researcher at the NGO "Human Rights Watch", author of the biased report incriminating the Cameroonian Armed Forces, and on the other hand, numerous secessionist terrorists who regularly provide her with photographs, videos, as well as information on their various abominations, since the beginning of the crisis in the North-West and South-West Regions, so that these may rather serve as arguments against our Defence and Security Forces.”

Accusations by governments against NGOs go beyond mere assertions. In the case of the Ngarbuh incident and the HRW researcher, the convincing evidence would be telephone exchanges between Ilaria Allegrozzi, the author of the report, and Nfor Yacubu, whose arrest took place on February 24, 2020, as stated by the Minister of Communication:

“In several of their telephone exchanges, the latter asked the terrorist, who was then presented as a specialist in faking images for secessionist propaganda, in addition to all the crimes, violence and illicit trafficking in which he engages on a daily basis, "to provide him as much as possible, by fabricating them from scratch, with visual documents, photographs and videos showing the Cameroonian Defence and Security Forces committing violence against civilians”. HRW is not the only NGO accused of this murky game in political crises in Africa. In the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is also concerned. The NGO seems to have been caught red-handed in the act of providing financial and logistical support to the secessionists in 2020 in the North West region. This led the Cameroonian authorities to suspend its activities throughout the country.

- **The commission of counter-expertise**, media emissaries and questioning of methodologies  
The line of defence of the States is diversifying with media battles, counter-expertise and methodological quarrels. While Equinoxes TV supports the NGO activists, national radio and television takes the opposite position. Experts take the floor to deconstruct the accusations. On public television, Professor Mathias Eric Owona Nguini questions the report of Ilaria

Allegrozi. He declared on March 3, 2020 that the said report was deleted from the Human Rights Watch website. Équinoxe Télévision denies this information, which opens a dispute between the television channel and the socio-politician. Ilaria Allegrozi, is described as a biased activist and is suspected of having a vendetta against Cameroon, because she usually takes the so-called terrorist side. For her, only Cameroon commits massacres, which is difficult to believe. Its methodology is discredited because it always puts forward witnesses and evidence that are not always present. If the dissemination of evidence and witnesses takes so long, observers believe that the creation and selection of witnesses is not done in an objective manner and aims more to sully the image of Cameroon," reads the website of dnconsulting.

After the deployment of all this rhetoric, the Cameroonian government, through its spokesperson, concluded without leaving any doubt on the will of certain NGOs to destabilize the State: *"This is how this terrible factory of lies set up by Mrs. Ilaria Allegrozi works, and which "Human Rights Watch" uses in a despicable way, with the objective of systematically stigmatizing the Cameroonian Armed Forces, and therefore, destabilizing our institutions"*.

#### - **Suspension of activities in the territory**

While the whole world should welcome in the 21st century the field work of INGOs/NGOs such as the Red Cross, MSF, Human Rights Watch, Transparency International, etc. in defending and protecting human rights or promoting governance, they are not exempt from the suspicion of being Western propaganda offices. According to "The Economist", some twenty countries limit the access of NGOs to foreign funding. Egypt is considering requiring all NGOs to seek permission from an intergovernmental committee before transferring funds from abroad. Other countries suspend or simply ban some of these structures from operating on their territory or declare some of their representatives or researchers non grata. This is what happened to Ilaria Allegrozi and HRW in Cameroon. And in the opinion of the public authorities, this is the reason for their wrath and their relentlessness. Thus, Minister SADI (Cameroonian government spokesperson during his February 2020 press briefing) found it important to reveal that:

*"Mrs. Ilaria Allegrozi, who, a few years ago, was employed by Amnesty International, before joining "Human Rights Watch", is not unknown in Cameroon. The permanently inaccurate and misleading nature of her information on our country, has indeed decided the Cameroonian authorities to expel her from the national territory, on April 12, 2019, and consequently stop all collaboration with the NGO that employs her."*

One can therefore understand the particular relentlessness with which, since then, Mrs. Allegrozi has been conducting a veritable vendetta against Cameroon," concluded the minister.

The report of the researcher, who never went to the field to conduct her own investigation, would thus be motivated more by bitterness and the desire for revenge than by objectivity and truth.

#### - **Sovereignty and the Institutional Response**

Legislative tightening. In front of what they consider as a threat to their security and sovereignty, several States are imposing drastic restrictions. Countries like Cameroon and Ethiopia regularly resort to suspending or dissolving NGOs, citing the fight against terrorism or money laundering.

Funding control. The requirement for transparency regarding sources of foreign income aims to prevent humanitarian aid from being used to finance political activities or subversive movements. For example, cameroonian authorities announced on December 2024 a ban of the activities of five non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accused of "illicit financing," citing possible cases of "money laundering" and "financing of terrorism." The ban, targeting two entities of the *Network of Human Rights Defenders in Central Africa (REDHAC)*, the L. M. Nanje Foundation Inc., *Reach Out Cameroon*, and the *Sociocultural Charitable Association of Cameroon*, was published on Friday by the Ministry of Territorial Administration, which is responsible for security matters (Le monde, 9 déc 2024). In Uganda, a new anti-interference law was promulgated on Sunday, May 17th 2026 by President Yoweri Museveni.

Civil society resistance. In some regions (particularly within the Alliance of Sahel States), local groups regularly demonstrate to denounce the interference of foreign powers under the guise of NGOs.

#### - **Management of legal proceedings**

It is not uncommon to see the denunciations of NGOs turn into real indictments and lead to legal action against States or their representatives. This is the case of the so-called "ill-gotten gains" trial. After ten years of intense legal struggle, the first historic trial in the "ill-gotten gains" case was held in Paris, from 19 June to 5 July 2017. Teodorin Obiang, Vice President of Equatorial Guinea was suspected of having built up considerable assets in France with public money diverted from his home country. On 27 October 2017, the Paris Correctional Court handed down its judgment: 3 years suspended prison sentence, a suspended fine of 30 million euros and to the full confiscation of his assets seized on French territory, with an estimated value of over 150 million euros. This is the first time that a senior foreign executive in office has been convicted in France for money laundering, including embezzlement of public funds and corruption.

At the origin of this judicial cabal, a complaint by the NGOs Transparency International France and Sherpa in 2007. In a press conference held by its ambassador to France, Equatorial Guinea denounced a "media tribunal" and "a desire to harm [its] leaders". For the ambassador of Equatorial Guinea in France, "it is an operation of destabilization of Equatorial Guinea. He castigates "so-called NGOs that have never set foot on Equatorial Guinean soil" and denounces the absence of evidence: "you can't manufacture evidence from Paris or Madrid". Finally, he mentioned the manoeuvres of opponents exiled in Spain. The Equatoguinean State will not be officially represented at the opening of the trial, but the son of the president, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, will be defended by his own lawyers, while the defense of the State chose to focus on the procedure launched at the International Court of Justice, seized on the subject, among others, of the immunity of the vice-president. The case has turned into a diplomatic row. Miguel Oyono Ndong Mifumu did not hesitate to consider that Equatorial Guinea was a bit "the unwelcome child" of a Francophonie that it chose to integrate of its own accord and hoped to be treated in the same way as the other countries of the African Francophone space. The comparison was made with Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville, countries that were also involved in ill-gotten gains cases, but which for the moment have escaped a trial before the French courts. "We are the little mouse of a French legal experiment," he concluded.

The accusations of NGOs very often lead to sanctions when they do not result in dismissal: freezing of bank accounts, seizure of assets, bans on international travel by the leaders of states and members of their families. They can even mobilize the compassion of the people and the international community and lead to the fall of regimes. This explains the great reluctance of weak states to accept the activities of these new actors in international relations.

## Conclusion

At the end of this reflexion, which was aimed more at renewing analyses of interactions between INGOs/NGOs and States in general and the African State in particular, it should be pointed out that the observations drawn from the analysis of the Cameroonian and Equatorial Guinean cases apply to most African countries where NGOs implement identical strategies. The humanitarian movement, which has emerged as an alternative form of international solidarity, a manifestation of empathy in international relations, and an impetus to bring together the needy and the less fortunate, has not escaped the implacable truth of international trade: the primacy of interests and the quest for power. Beyond the redistribution of the cards between the classic actors and the new actors on the international scene, there is the question of the new face of neo-colonialism.

On the first point of the loss of power by the Leviathan, whose monstrosity has melted away in the face of the advent of other diffuse actors, among which the subject of this article, the INGOs/NGOs, must be mentioned insistently; it must be said that they are now omnipresent, influential and highly visible. This visibility has gone beyond the limits of simple humanitarian acts, reports and pleas to become real acts of accusation challenging the central actor of international relations, the State. From being the guarantors of national or international order, the latter have gone from the comfortable position of monopoly to the uncomfortable one of constantly justifying themselves.

On the second point, which is linked to the post-colonial context and which, in more than one way, must be questioned, we must realize that NGOs no longer observe the principles of neutrality and non-interference in the affairs of States. They interfere in politics for those who specialize in human rights and governance issues; they maintain the idea of misery and the inability of the countries of the South to develop, with the image of eternal recipients of assistance, for those who deal with development. Borrowing from Barbara Delhez, 'yesterday colonisation and its missionaries, today unbridled capitalism of which NGOs are in a way the auxiliary, represent the different faces of the same economic imperialism which induces an unequal division of labour at the global level, which some NGOs do not hesitate to exploit' (2016: 5).

This analysis may seem fallacious and its arguments may be accused of giving in to the international thesis of "conspiracy", because NGOs have contributed and are contributing to the improvement of living conditions in Africa. Nor can we deny their immense contribution to the improvement of state governance with their role as countervailing powers. However, we must

be careful not to hide our faces and ignore the reality on the ground. We must ask ourselves whether NGOs are aware of the problems they cause and whether they take the time and distance necessary to try to formulate a self-criticism of their action, as Marie-Christine Guéneau already suggested in 1986, because these concerns are still relevant. The reality is that it is the entirety of NGO action in Africa that needs to be urgently evaluated, whether it be local or international associations. Even if it is true that researchers such as Pérousse de Montclos of the IRD and Barbara Delhez of the ThinkingAfrica network have already traced the path.

## References

- AUDIER, S. (2006), « Tocqueville, Notre Contemporain ? » ; S.E.R., Études 2006/4 Tome 404 ; pp.487-496 ISSN 0014-1941.
- BADIE, B. (2004), L'impuissance de la puissance. Essai sur les nouvelles relations internationales, Paris, Fayard, 2004.
- BATTISTELLA D ; PETITEVILLE F ; SMOUTS M-C ; VENNESSON P, (2012), Dictionnaire des Relations internationales, 3e éd. Dalloz, 572 p.
- BIOFORCE, (2012) ; « Les ONG, acteurs incontournables de la Solidarité Internationale ? » ; 20 novembre 2012 ; en ligne sur : <https://www.ritimo.org/Les-ONG-au-travers-de-l-histoire-du-mouvement-de-la-solidarite-leursprincipe>; consulté le 26/07/2021 : 10 :15.
- CAZABAT, C. (2016), « Les stratégies de renforcement des organisations de la société civile en Afrique subsaharienne, nouvel éléphant blanc de l'aide au développement ? L'exemple du Cameroun » ; Mondes en Développement Vol.44-2016/1-n°173.
- CHAVAGNEUX, C. (2004), Économie politique internationale, Paris : La Découverte.
- CONDAMINES, C. (1988), « Les ONG et les pouvoirs publics » ; Tiers-Monde, tome 29, n° 116, 1988. Le logement des pauvres dans les grandes villes du Tiers Monde. pp. 1229-1236;doi: <https://doi.org/10.3406/tiers.1988.3592>[https://www.persee.fr/doc/tiers\\_0040-7356\\_1988\\_num\\_29\\_116\\_3592](https://www.persee.fr/doc/tiers_0040-7356_1988_num_29_116_3592)
- COX, R. X., (2002); The political economy of a plural world: critical reflections on power, morals and civilization, London: Routledge.
- DEBOS M. ET GOHENEIX A. (2005), « Les ONG et la fabrique de l'«opinion publique internationale » Presses de Sciences Po ; « Raisons politiques » 2005/3 no 19 ; pp. 63-80 ISSN 1291-1941ISBN 2724630203
- DECAUX, Emmanuel. 2004. Droit international public (4e éd.). Paris: Dalloz.
- DELHEZ, B. « Vues des vérandas africaines : Les ONG internationales à la reconquête d'une Afrique postcoloniale », NAP n° 55 – décembre 2016.
- FINKELSTEIN, S. (1995); “What is Global Governance”, Global Governance, vol. 1, n°3 sept-déc 1995.
- FUENTES VÉLIZ J-A. « L'évolution du rôle des organisations non gouvernementales dans le droit de l'environnement. » In: Revue Européenne de Droit de l'Environnement, n° 4, 2007. pp. 401-430; doi : <https://doi.org/10.3406/reden.2007.1980>[https://www.persee.fr/doc/reden\\_1283-8446\\_2007\\_num\\_11\\_4\\_1980](https://www.persee.fr/doc/reden_1283-8446_2007_num_11_4_1980)

- 
- GAZANO, A. (2011), Les Relations internationales, Mémentos, 6e édition ; Gualino ; Lextenso éditions.
- GUILLERMOU, Y. (2009) « ONG et dynamiques politiques en Afrique », Journal des anthropologues [En ligne], 94-95 | 2003, mis en ligne le 22 février 2009, consulté le 19 avril 2019. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/jda/1980> ; DOI : 10.4000/jda.1980.
- HOURQUEBIE, D. (2001) « Médecins sans frontières : la saga des French doctors », article publié le 20 décembre 2001, sur le site : <http://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2001/12/20/213719-medecins-sans-frontieres-la-saga-des-french-doctors.html>
- M'BOKOLO E. (2002), « Afrique : colonisation, décolonisation et postcolonialisme Géopolitique et mondialisation », Université de tous les savoirs, volume 19, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2002, pp. 143-167.
- MAIETTA, M ? (2015) ; « Origine et évolution des ONG dans le système humanitaire international » ; Revue internationale et stratégique ; 2015/2 n° 98 ; pp. 53 à 59.
- MENENDEZ I. (2005) ; « Les ambiguïtés de la notion de gouvernance dans le discours des relations internationales » note de lecture sur Du bon usage de la gouvernance en relations internationales de MARIE-CLAUDE SMOUT ; <http://www.institut-gouvernance.org/en/document/fiche-document-36.html>.
- MENGUE, M-T. et TROIT, V. (dir.) (2023), Transition humanitaire au Cameroun, Éditions Karthala.
- NLOGA ETOUNDI .J (2023) « ONG Internationales et aide au développement dans la Région du Sud du Cameroun : la relation d'agence », African Scientific Journal « Volume 03, Numéro 18 » pp: 293 –321.
- NYE J. et KEOHANE R., (1977); Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition, Boston : Little.
- OCHA, Cameroon Humanitarian Response Plan, Février 2025.
- OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, Cameroon Humanitarian Response Plan 2025, Trends in coordinated plan requirements, <https://fts.unocha.org/plans/1266/summary>
- OWONA NGUINI M. É. ET MENTHONG H-L. (2018) « Gouvernement perpétuel» et démocratisation janusienne au Cameroun (1990-2018) ; Politique africaine n° 150 ; juin 2018 ; pp.97-114.
- PAVOT, D. (2017). « Le retrait de la déclaration du Rwanda permettant aux individus et ONG de saisir la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples » ; Revue québécoise de droit international ; 30 (2), 221–237. <https://doi.org/10.7202/1064684ar>
-

- 
- PEROUSE DE MONTCLOS, M-A. (2008), « ONG, image et transparence. À la recherche de l'idéal perdu » ; Questions internationales N° 33 – septembre-octobre 2008, pp 69-71.
- PEROUSE DE MONTCLOS, M-A. (2015), Pour un développement « humanitaire » ? Les ONG à l'épreuve de la critique. Nouvelle édition [en ligne]. Marseille : IRD Éditions, 2015 (généré le 03 mai 2019). Disponible sur Internet : ISBN : 9782709921657. DOI: 10.4000/books.irdeditions.8720.
- PEVEHOUSE J. C. W. ET GOLDSTEIN J. S. (2013-2014), International Relations, Eleventh Edition, Pearson; 497 P.
- PIROTTE G. ; PONCELET M., « Éveil des sociétés civiles en milieu urbain et organisations non gouvernementales : les exemples de Cotonou et Lubumbashi » ; Presses de Sciences Po ; « Autrepart » 2002/3 n° 23 ; pp. 73-88.
- PONCELET M. ET PIROTTE G. « L'invention africaine des sociétés civiles : déni théorique, figure imposée, prolifération empirique » ; De Boeck Supérieur ; « Mondes en développement » 2007/3 n° 139 ; pp. 9-23.
- RICHARD DAVIES T. (2012), « La transformation des ONG internationales et leurs effets sur l'aide au développement », International Development Policy ; Revue internationale de politique de développement [Online], 3 ; 2012, Online since 03 April 2012, connection on 06 April 2021. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/949>; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.949>
- ROSENAU, J. (1995); "Governance in the Twenty-first Century", Global Governance, vol. 1, n° 1, hiver 1995.
- SADI R. E. (2020), COMMUNICATION GOUVERNEMENTALE réponse du gouvernement camerounais aux affirmations infondées et outrancières contenues dans le rapport de l'ONG HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, publié le 25 février 2020 point de presse du MINCOM déclaration du ministre de la communication, Yaoundé, le 27 février 2020.
- SINDJOUN L, (2002 a), L'État ailleurs, entre noyau dur et case vide ; Paris, Economica, 332 p.
- SMOUTS M-C, (éd) (1998), Les nouvelles relations internationales, Paris, Presse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 412 p.
- SMOUTS, M-C. (1997), « La construction équivoque d'une « opinion » publique mondiale », Revue Tiers Monde, septembre 1997, t. 38, n° 151, pp. 677-693.
- SMOUTS, M-C. (1998) ; « Du bon usage de la gouvernance en relations internationales », Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales, Mars 1998.
-

- STRANGE, S. (1996); The retreat of the state. The diffusion of power in the world economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- YEBEGA NDJANA, N. J. (2016) ; « Droit constitutionnel et politique : l'instabilité des normes constitutionnelles au service d'un pouvoir politique viager et successoral en Afrique » ; in GUILLAUME EKAMBI DIBONGUE (dir.), Le chef, la famille et le pouvoir : la tendance dynastique dans les États africains ; Yaoundé, Ifrikiya, Interlignes, octobre 2016, pp. 163-192.