Auteur 1 : BAKITI ba MBOG BINYET Joseph Olivier


Keywords  :

Supreme State Audit, Offer, Public Services


Abstract:

To reduce deviant behaviour and the misuse of the discretionary power of the public manager, the State control bodies in Cameroon witnessed a reinforcement of their powers, which was intended to help improve the supply of public services in the short term.

From an analysis of the organizational routines of the Supreme State Audit, this article aims to show that by trying to reduce asymmetric information and control the discretionary power of the public manager, these routines rather strengthen its “procedurally rational” behaviour through the process of selective adaptation and encourage bureaucratic management as an ideal type, the very source of inertia levelled at public authorities.




Publié

30/10/2021

Vol. 3 No 8 (2021)

Rubrique

Articles